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CRIMINAL LAw - INSANE PERSONS - COMPETENCY To STAND 
TRIAL* - Mental unsoundness in a person accused of a crime raises 
two distinct legal questions. One is the question of the individ-
ual's responsibility for his behavior and the other is the question 
of the individual's competency to enter into the legal procedures 
of trial or punishment.1 In recent years considerable attention 
has been given to matters of responsibility, 2 but relatively little 
attention has been paid to the problem of incompetency and espe-
cially to the consequences of incompetency proceedings. In order 
to analyze and evaluate the operations of the Michigan law in the 
area of incompetency to stand trial,3 two psychiatrists joined two 
law students to conduct field research at Ionia State Hospital to 
which all persons found incompetent to stand trial are committed.4 
This comment reports and analyzes the results of this field re-
search. Attention is given also to the merits of alternative proce-
dures for the commitment and treatment of incompetents. 
I. INCOMPETENCY PROCEEDINGS - COMMON LAW 
It was the rule at common law that an accused could not be 
required to plead to an indictment or be tried for a crime when 
he was so mentally disordered that he could not meet the common 
• The authors wish to thank Dr. R. E. Cooper, Medical Superintendent of Ionia State 
Hospital, and his staff for their cooperation in this study. 
1 WEllIOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 428, 430 (1954) [hereinafter 
cited as WEllIOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER]. 
2 See HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw ch. 14 (2d ed. 1960); WEIHoFEN, THE URCE 
TO PUNISH (1956); B1ccs, THE Gun.TY MIND (1955); ROYAL CoMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISH• 
MENT, REPORT (1949-1953). 
3 M1CH. CoMP. LAws § 767.27 (1948). 
4 The total patient population at Ionia was 1484 as of August 1960. Of these 755 are 
classified as "criminal court referrals," 356 as Criminal Sexual Psychopaths, 101 as con-
victs serving sentences (transferred to Ionia from prison), 140 as convicts with expired 
sentences (adjudicated mentally ill in retention proceedings), ll8 as hoinicidal patients 
transferred from civil institutions, 4 as ex-convicts declared mentally ill, and 10 unclassified. 
The majority of "criininal court referrals" are those committed as incompetent to stand 
trial. However, about 50 of the 755 are persons found not guilty of murder by reason of 
insanity and cominitted under section 766.15c of the Michigan Compiled Laws. Addi-
tionally, of the 393 patients of all classifications currently on parole, approximately 200 
had been committed for incompetency. Conclusions regarding the 755 are based upon a 
representative and random sample of 77 patients whose records were studied. Selecting 
at random one record of every five subjects in the appropriate category, we studied the 
records of 21 persons discharged back to the committing court by the hospital during the 
period July 1954 - December 1960; 20 records of -persons currently on parole; and ll rec-
ords of persons discharged from parole since October 1947. Each subject's record was 
examined for background information, nature of the judicial proceeding, and hospital 
and parole experience. Further, ll patien_ts were interviewed by the two psychiatrists 
participating in the study. The investigation was aided by the opportunity afforded us 
by the hospital superintendent to observe a staff interview of a patient and to interview 
the doctors on the hospital staff. 
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law tests of competency; that is, when he could not understand 
the nature and object of the proceedings against him, comprehend 
his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and assist in 
his defense. IS 
The common-law judge had wide discretion in calling and 
conducting a competency examination. Whether an examination 
into the defendant's competency would be made at all depended 
on whether the judge had reason to believe that the defendant 
was mentally unable to proceed with trial.6 It was often said that 
once a competency examination was ordered, the judge was free 
to use any method for determining the accused's competency which 
was "discreet and convenient."7 Also the judge had discretion to 
summon a jury to make the determination of competency or to 
make such determination himself.8 If it was determined that the 
accused was incompetent, the common-law practice seems to have 
been to confine him in jail. Indeed, it had been held that in the 
absence of statutes the judge had power only to order the incom-
petent confined in jail.9 He would then be tried at such time as 
the judge determined his competency restored. 
At the common law there was no right of appeal from the in-
competency hearing itself, but the issue of the accused's compe-
tency could be raised on appeal from the criminal trial. Despite 
authority that an accused's constitutional rights would be violated 
if he were tried while incompetent,1° the judge's decision was 
generally sustained unless it was clearly arbitrary.11 Since most 
states have merely codified the common law in this field,12 wide 
IS WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER 431. 
6 Id. at 433, 444. 
7 See, e.g., People v. Rhinelander, 2 N.Y. Crim. 335 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1884). 
8 WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER 445, 446-47. 
9 Hawie v. Hawie, 128 Miss. 473, 91 So. 131 (1922). 
10 Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937 (6th Cir. 1899) (trial of insane person under 
indictment involving liberty or life violates due process); United States v. Gundelfinger, 
98 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (dictum) (fair trial embraces right to be mentally 
present); United States ex rel. Mazy v. Ragen, 149 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1945) (dictum), 
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 791 (1946) (trial of insane person raises federal due process ques-
tions). 
11 WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER 474. 
12See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 15:267 (1950); MINN. STAT. § 610.10 (1957); N.D. CEN-
TURY CODE § 29·20-01 (1960); ORE. REv. STAT. § 136.150 (1959). 
From time to time statutes similar to the Michigan incompetency statute have been 
attacked on the grounds that they violate the accused's state or federal constitutional 
rights. Such attacks have been almost invariably rejected for the reason that a sanity hear-
ing and commitment do not constitute a trial. These procedures are designed to protect 
the accused, not to incriminate him. See cases collected in Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 434 (1953). 
Although the Michigan statute has not been tested against the federal constitution, the 
Michigan Supreme Court has held that this statute "preserves, instead of deprives [th~ 
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discretionary powers continue to be exercised by the trial courts 
of these states. 
II. INCOMPETENCY PROCEEDINGS - MICHIGAN 
A. Commitment: Law and Operation 
1. Law. The Michigan incompetency statute13 follows the 
basic pattern of the common law. It requires the court to hold a 
sanity hearing14 to determine the accused's competency to proceed 
with trial when one accused of a felony "shall appear to be insane." 
The question of the accused's competency can be raised by the 
accused, the prosecuting attorney, or the court.1 is Whether the 
defendant "appears to be insane" within the statute may be decided 
either by the court or by a jury.16 
If it is determined that the defendant does "appear to be in-
sane," the court fixes a time and place for a hearing of the compe-
tency issue at which it "shall call 2 or more reputable physicians 
and other credible witnesses to testify at said hearing, and [ shall 
call] the prosecuting attorney to aid in the examination and if it 
be deemed necessary to call a jury for that purpose, [ the court] is 
fully empowered to compel the attendance of witnesses and 
jurors."17 
The statute retains the common law three-pronged test of in-
competency: "[T]he test on the trial of [the defendant's compe-
tency ]18 • • • shall be whether such person is [I] capable of under-
defendant] ... of due process of law." People v. Janek, 287 Mich. 563, 567, 283 N.W. 
689, 690 (1939). 
13 MICH. CoMP. LAws § 767.27 (1948). 
14 The statute actually directs the court to "inquire and ascertain the issue of in-
sanity.'' MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.27 (1949). This is done by means of the sanity hearing. 
15 If the defense desires to raise the issue of defendant's competency, written notice 
to this effect must be given to the prosecuting attorney not less than four days before the 
-scheduled date of trial. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 768.20 (1948). 
16 "[W]hen a person accused of a felony shall appear to be insane • . . the court, 
being certified by the jury or otherwise of the fact, shall carefully inquire and ascertain 
the issue of insanity.'' MICH. CoMP. LAws § 767.27 (1948). 
17 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.27 (1948). 
18 The word "competency" is not used in the statute, but use of the co=on law 
competency tests indicates that "competency" is in issue. The statute actually reads: "If 
it is claimed that such person became insane after the commission of the felony with 
which he is charged and before or during the trial thereon" then the test of whether he 
is mentally able to be tried will be the common law competency test. Although this 
provision has not been reviewed in Michigan, other states have interpreted similar clauses 
to require that the accused must appear to have become insane since the commission of 
the offense. This distinction based upon the time when the accused became mentally 
unfit is not justified by the common law nor is it practiced by the Michigan courts. See 
WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER 431-33. 
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standing the nature and object of the proceedings against him and 
[2] of comprehending his own condition in reference to such 
proceedings and [3] of assisting in his defense in a rational or 
reasonable manner."19 
It would be expected that if the defendant is found to be in-
competent, he would be sent to a rehabilitative institution. This 
the statute does provide, but it does not use incompetency termi-
nology or refer to the incompetency tests: 
"If such person is found insane, the judge of said court 
shall order that he be discharged from imprisonment and that 
he be turned over to the sheriff for safe custody and removal 
to Ionia state hospital, to which hospital such person shall be 
committed to remain until restored to sanity."20 
The use of "insane" and "sanity" can be explained by the fact 
that it is this same provision which provides for examination and 
commitment of persons found not responsible for criminal acts. 
Both these and incompetents are sent to Ionia, and the general 
word "insane" encompasses the criteria for commitment for both 
groups. However, with respect to the criterion for commitment 
of incompetents, reason would indicate that the legislature in-
tended the three-pronged competency test to be used.21 
2. Operation. At the hearing to determine the competency 
of the accused to stand trial "two reputable physicians" are re-
quired to testify regarding the accused's mental state. The influ-
ence which their testimony exerts upon the competency determi-
nation is substantial, for they speak as experts in a field shrouded 
in mystery for both judge and jury. Not understanding the medi-
cal complexities associated with mental illness, the legal authori-
ties enunciate legal policy objectives and broad competency tests 
by way of statute and then rely upon the doctors to apply these 
tests to the individual defendants. 
Our study suggests that the Michigan statute's direction to 
commit the accused if he cannot meet the competency test is being 
very loosely applied in many cases. Several records studied at Ionia 
indicated that the doctors confuse the legal standards for compe-
tency with those for responsibility. An example of this confusion 
of legal concepts was evidenced by a report which read: "This man 
19 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 767 2;7 (1948). 
20 MICH. COMP. LAws § 767:2.7 (1948). (Emphasis added.) 
21 Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum to Conference Participants on Over-
crowded Conditions at Ionia State Hospital, September 8, 1960. 
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does not know right from wrong, he is incompetent, he is not able 
to help his counsel, he should be committed to an institution 
because he is insane and should be released only when he is found 
to be sane." Most of the records which did not manifest such 
confusion were form statements which simply parroted the incom-
petency test of the statute.22 
The confusion of legal concepts is caused in part by the impre-
cise wording of the Michigan statute which codifies the three-
pronged common-law test as the criterion for testing the accused's 
ability to proceed with trial but subsequently uses the word "in-
sane" to indicate the criterion for committing him to Ionia State 
Hospital. Another probable causal factor is that frequently the 
"two reputable physicians" who make psychiatric determinations 
have no psychiatric training. Also, in many cases a report on the 
defendant's condition is prepared by a social worker or psycholo-
gist. After th'e doctor interviews the patient he adds a covering 
letter to the psychologist's report suggesting that the accused be 
committed. 
The records also indicate that some of the examining physi-
cians assumed the role of moral experts. In one case the doctor 
recommended commitment because of the patient's "hostile and 
aggressive tendencies." However, it may be supposed that those 
defendants well enough for sentencing to prison exhibit similar 
tendencies. In another instance the examining physicians said: 
"We actually feel the patient could cooperate ·with counsel but 
that it would be better if he were to be hospitalized in Ionia." 
This departure from the physician's proper role as expert medical 
witness seems to be based on two factors. First, the physician does 
not understand that the legal objective is the narrow one of de-
termining whether the defendant is competent to proceed ·with 
trial but rather tends to think of his function as a broader one of 
protecting society, the defendant, or both. Implicit in many of the 
physicians' recommendations is the feeling that the individual 
defendant is such a pathetic figure and so clearly not responsible 
for his crime that he should not be consigned to prison. Second, 
the physicians seem to believe that commitment to Ionia is infi-
nitely preferable to a prison sentence. Misapprehending the pur-
pose of the incompetency proceedings and his role in them, the 
physician assumes the responsibility for insuring that the defend-
ant is treated in a more humane atmosphere than a prison. Exam-
22 These "form" reports were employed in 54 of the 129 records studied. 
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pies of this type of distortion occurred in many of the hospital 
records studied, but were most prominent in the records of elderly 
persons or those who were obviously mentally defective. 
It is our judgment that as a result of this loose application of 
the competency tests, persons are being committed to Ionia who 
are not in fact legally incompetent. This judgment is corroborated 
by the fact that frequently the Ionia Hospital physicians' diag-
nosis of the accused varied from the opinion presented to the court 
by the court-appointed physicians. It was not unusual to find that 
the hospital staff found a newly-admitted patient was mentally ill 
but nevertheless able to meet the legal competency standards. 
B. Procedures at the Hospital 
The Ionia State Hospital is overcrowded and understaffed. 
The total patient population of 1484 as of August 1960 represents 
a patient excess over maximum capacity of 262 persons or about 
21 percent. Of the total number of patients approximately 755, 
or 51 percent, were committed because incompetent to stand trial. 
To administer to the needs of these patients there are but four 
physicians including the superintendent of the hospital. Incompe-
tency as a legal concept is not meaningful to these doctors, for 
whether a person is "sane enough" for trial is a legal concept 
incapable of precise medical evaluation and determination. Since 
the doctors do not understand the law, nor their role in its admin-
istration, it is not surprising that clinical results bear scant resem-
blance to legal policy objectives. 
A less obvious but perhaps more important problem concerns 
the goals of the hospital. Patients' progress notes indicate that 
the hospital staff frequently does not know what is expected of 
them. The hospital's objective appears to be to restore the incom-
petent to "soundness of mind," a goal which could be, and in 
practice is, very different from the goal of restoring the patient to 
a condition which would permit him to stand trial. For most 
categories of patients at Ionia23 the objective of "restoration to 
sanity" is sound. It is easy to understand that this objective could 
be unconsciously applied to the total patient population. Without 
doubt much of the confusion regarding therapeutic goals for pa-
tients who are incompetent to stand trial results from the necessity 
of establishing different standards of cure for the various classifica-
23 For a breakdown on the number of patients in each category, see note 4 supra. 
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tions of patients at the hospital. A lack of clearcut therapeutic 
goals results in a case such as the following: F. C., a twenty-five-year-
old male, has been held as an incompetent patient for four years 
while hospital personnel work toward achieving "insight into his 
behavior" and "confession of his crime." 
The therapeutic procedures carried out at Ionia State Hospital 
differ relatively little from those carried on at other state mental 
institutions. Little in the way of individual attention can be of-
fered. The incoming patient is given a mental and physical exam-
ination upon arrival and assigned to a ward. Contact with his 
staff physician is frequent at first while evaluation is in process, 
but the longer the patient remains in the hospital, the less frequent 
are the doctor's interviews. The records studied indicated that 
only 33 percent of the patients were seen by a doctor as often as 
once every three months and 61 percent were seen by a doctor only 
every six months. The infrequency of doctor-patient interviews 
is not solely caused by crowded conditions. Since the interview 
should further some recognizable goal, if such a goal does not exist, 
the interview will be unproductive and is therefore less likely to 
be held. 
Other therapeutic efforts consist primarily of relieving the 
patients of their social and legal responsibilities and exposing 
them to a healthy hospital environment. Such techniques have 
definite value, although limited to be sure, and ·with this mini-
mum treatment alone a large percentage of the individuals com-
mitted as incompetent could probably be expected to reach a 
state of legal competency in a relatively short period of time if 
the hospital were to concentrate on this goal. Other therapeutic 
endeavors consist of the extensive use of tranquilizing medication, 
electroconvulsive shock therapy, and limited group therapy usually 
conducted by a psychologist, social worker, or "lay therapist." 
C. Discharge 
In addition to commitment and treatment of incompetents, 
the Michigan statute provides for their discharge back to the 
committing court.24 Since the reason for commitment of the 
incompetent is his failure to comply with the standards of com-
petency, one would likewise expect that the criterion for discharge 
back to the committing court would be the accused's ability to 
24MrCH. COMP. LAws § 767.21 (1948). 
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"pass" the same competency tests. However, the stated criterion 
for such discharge is not the three-pronged competency test but 
that of "restoration to sanity." 
"When [the accused] ... shall be restored to sanity, and 
that fact has been determined by the superintendent of said 
hospital or by any other proceeding authorized by this sec-
tion, the said superintendent of said hospital shall forthwith 
certify that fact in ,;vriting to said judge and prosecuting at-
torney. The judge shall thereupon immediately require the 
sheriff without delay to bring such person from the said hos-
pital and place him in proper custody until he is remanded to 
prison, brought to trial or judgment, as the case may be, or is 
legally discharged."25 
This use of the "restoration to sanity" standard can again be ex-
plained by the fact that the statute covers procedures for commit-
ment and discharge of both incompetents and those found non-
responsible. The proposition that the legislature in the case of 
incompetents intended "restoration to sanity" to refer specifically 
to the three-part competency test is supported by the Michigan 
Attorney General's office: 
"[I]t would seem that the law does differentiate between 
those individuals who are committed because they are crim-
inally insane, which fact has justified their acquittal on crim-
inal charges, and those individuals who are committed be-
cause they cannot stand trial. In the case of a person who is 
committed after acquittal as criminally insane, the legal and 
logical test to be applied would seem to be whether he has 
actually been restored to sanity so that he no longer represents 
a threat to society. 
"But, in the case of an individual who is committed before 
trial, the legal and logical test would seem to be whether he 
has been restored to sanity to the extent that the reason for his 
commitment no longer exists, i.e., that he now is 'capable of 
understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against 
him and of comprehending his own condition in reference to 
such proceedings and of assisting in his defense in a rational 
and reasonable manner.' "26 
It is probable that this vague criterion for discharge - "restor-
ation to sanity" - is partly responsible for the indicated lack of 
25 MICH, COMP. LAws § 767 Z/ (1948). (Emphasis added.) 
26 Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum to Conference on Overcrowded Con-
ditions at Ionia State Hospital, September 8, 1960. 
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defined therapeutic goals in treatment of incompetents at Ionia. 
Further, the vague term "sanity" can justify retention of incom-
petents until it is felt "safe" to return them to society, a criterion 
for discharge apparently underlying many cases. Moreover, this 
statutory criterion also justifies the hospital's frequently stated goal 
of restoring "soundness of mind" to the incompetent before dis-
charging him. 
D. Parole 
The Michigan incompetency statute was amended in 194 7 
to provide that any patient may be paroled or given a leave of 
absence by the hospital superintendent. This amendment, part 
of the present statute, provides: 
"The superintendent of the Ionia state hospital may grant 
a parole or leave of absence to any person committed under 
the provisions of this section subject to such conditions as may 
be prescribed by the department of mental health, provided 
such parole is concurred in by the committing court after due 
notice has been given by mail to the prosecuting attorney of 
the county from which the patient was committed. 
"Such paroled person committed under the provisions of 
this section who has not recovered sanity but whose discharge, 
in the judgment of the superintendent, will not be detrimental 
to the public welfare and will not be injurious to the patient, 
may be discharged, provided such discharge is concurred in 
by the committing court and due notice has been mailed to 
the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the patient 
was committed within 10 days prior to such discharge.''27 
Our study shows that the hospital requires a high degree of 
mental alertness and exemplary conduct before even considering 
a patient for parole. Before a patient can be paroled he must 
come before a staff conference composed of all the doctors plus 
the ward attendants, psychologists, and social workers. As in the 
case of doctor visitations, the frequency of a patient's staff con-
ferences varies inversely with the length of his confinement at the 
hospital. At first he may be "staffed" as often as every three 
months. But as time passes the meetings are held less and less 
frequently and it is not unusual for long-time patients to be staff-
interviewed less than once every two years. The records indicate 
27MrCH. COMP. LAws § 76721 (1948). 
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that the standards which the doctors set for those seeking parole 
are "soundness of mind," "social competency," and "emotional 
maturity." In addition, factors quite apart from the patient's 
mental state are considered. Whether the patient has a home in 
Michigan, whether he has a family to look after him, and whether 
he can find employment are fully as important to his chance for 
parole as is his mental condition. In one instance, a woman had 
been in the hospital for over two years and the reports were ex-
tremely pessimistic concerning her condition. It appeared that 
her chances of parole or discharge were exceedingly remote when 
a letter arrived from a lawyer expressing concern. This was fol-
lowed by an inquiry from the committing court. Immediately the 
tone of her progress reports changed and within three months she 
was paroled. 
Once paroled, the patient must meet strict standards of conduct 
to retain his valued status. He may not drink, drive a car except 
as necessary in his work, or marry without permission from the 
hospital. He must report periodically to the parole authorities at 
a clinic or state hospital near his home, and he must be able to 
hold a job and make a successful adjustment in society. If he is 
able to maintain these high standards of conduct for a period of 
three years, he is then eligible for discharge. 
Although the statute provides for discharge of paroled persons 
who have "not recovered sanity," it is clear that anyone meeting 
the criteria for parole could meet the relatively modest standards 
required in order to stand trial. The provision for parole makes 
no sense as part of incompetency to stand trial procedure. If the 
defendant is well enough for parole, he is well enough for trial. 
If he is to be tried after discharge from parole, such a procedure 
denies him his right to a speedy trial guaranteed him by the Mich-
igan constitution28 and state statute,29 and is vulnerable to a charge 
of invalidity. If he is not to be tried, but is to be released into 
society after discharge from parole, the only proper way for the 
28 MICH, CONST. art. 2, § 19. 
20 "The people of this state and persons charged with crime are entitled to and shall 
have a speedy trial and determination of all prosecutions and it is hereby made the duty 
of all public officers having duties to perform in any criminal case, to bring such case to 
a final determination without delay except as may be necessary to secure the accused a 
fair and impartial trial." MICH. CoMP. LAws § 768.l (1948). (Emphasis added.) It be• 
labors the obvious to suggest that parole of incompetents is not necessary to secure them 
a "fair and impartial trial." 
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state to hold him as a parolee would appear to be by means of a 
civil commitment.30 
IV. SOME RESULTS OF THE MICHIGAN SYSTEM 
A. Legal Results 
We earlier indicated belief that some persons have been sent 
to Ionia who are not in fact legally incompetent and that there 
appears to be a conflict between the apparent goals of incom-
petency law and the hospital goals in treating incompetents. At 
common law it was for the protection of his rights that an incom-
petent was not tried, and this same idea appears to be the basis 
for the Michigan statute. Once the defendant is again competent 
to stand trial the desire to protect his rights should compel his 
early return to the committing court for trial. Society also has the 
"right" to try him at this time. But since the hospital does not 
concentrate on the goal of making the defendant competent for 
trial, and in many cases instead concentrates on achieving the more 
difficult goal of restoring "soundness of mind," many defendants 
are deprived of a chance to complete their trials. 
If our estimate is correct that many incompetents at Ionia could 
be readied for trial with existing facilities in a short period of time, 
it is indefensible that for a substantal number of defendants com-
mitment to Ionia is the equivalent of a life sentence. During the 
period July 1954 to December 1960 a total of 470 defendants were 
committed to Ionia as incompetent to stand trial, a rate of about 
84 admissions per year. During this same period approximately 
105 were discharged back to the committing court, a rate of little 
more than 16 per year.31 Even if there is added to this figure ap-
proximately 15 who are paroled in any given year there are many 
more admitted to Ionia than are released. How many of the pres-
ent 755 incompetents will be discharged is impossible to say with 
complete accuracy but if the past rates are any guide, the number 
discharged is likely to fall well short of one-half. The rest can 
so It should also be pointed out that this anomalous provision for parole is probably 
a major reason for the confusion in therapeutic goals at the hospital and the lack of 
concentration on readying the accused for trial. As a result the 124 persons paroled during 
the past ten years should instead have been returned to the committing court as competent 
to stand trial. 
31 The hospital reported 319 releases during 1958-1959. However, most of these were 
committed for diagnosis only. Incompetents comprise only a small percentage of these 
releases. 
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expect to spend the rest of their lives at the hospital.32 This system 
accounts for the clear preference of many incompetents for confine-
ment at the state penitentiary at Jackson rather than commitment 
to Ionia. 
Moreover, confinement at Ionia because of incompetence to 
stand trial is not deemed imprisonment to be computed upon the 
patient's subsequent conviction and sentence.33 The sentence 
begins to run only after conviction. This should be contrasted 
with the provisions of a Michigan statute33a which requires an ap-
plication to the probate court for civil commitment to retain those 
patients who have been convicted of a crime but who subsequently 
are sent to Ionia because of mental illness and are still residents at 
Ionia when their sentences expire. The incompetent who has 
never faced trial need never be civilly committed under the present 
procedures. 
Instead of protection for the defendant until he is ready for 
trial, the administration of mental incompetents more closely re-
sembles an alternative to the regular penal system. Through the 
use of incompetency law those found dangerous to society by rea-
son of mental affliction can be isolated without the formalities of 
trial and conviction. Statutory ambiguity and hospital misunder-
standing are not solely to blame. Acquiescence by the courts and 
police in a system producing the above figures on "inflow and out-
flow" of incompetents suggests satisfaction with the system's opera-
tion. The almost total lack of judicial or police inquiry into a 
patient's progress suggests indifference to whether these persons are 
ever brought to trial. This is demonstrated by the additional fact 
that in most cases when the defendant is discharged to the com-
mitting court the charges against him are dismissed, and he is 
released without trial. The authors reviewed the records of 21 
incompetent patients discharged back to the committing court for 
trial. The records showed that 14 of these patients were returned 
to the Recorder's Court in Detroit. A review of these records 
at the Recorder's Court by the authors revealed that not one 
of the 14 had been tried after being returned to the court. 
This fact lends support to the conclusion that the Ionia State Hos-
32 E.g., J. C., a sixty-six-year-old man, was committed to Ionia pending trial on a 
gross indecency charge in 1926. He is still under treatment at Ionia, now showing signs 
of "simple psychosis." 
331n re Roberts, 310 Mich. 372, 17 N.W.2d 218 (1945). 
33• MICH. CoMP. LAws § 330.68 (1948). 
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pital is often used as a place to incarcerate persons without benefit 
of trial. When this period of incarceration is ended the state ap-
parently considers that adequate punishment has been accom-
plished. Thus it appears that the emphasis in fact is not on protec-
tion of the accused but on protection of society. 
Although the Michigan competency statute, providing for ex-
amination and commitment of the defendant, is not invalid on its 
face, commitment for an indefinite period of time and without 
periodic and thorough review appears to violate34 the protection 
afforded the defendant by the due process clause of the federal 
constitution35 and the due process and speedy trial clauses of the 
Michigan constitution.36 
B. Non-Legal Results 
I. The Doctor at the Incompetency Hearings. Certainly 
most doctors would agree that their proper function in hearings 
to determine competency consists of a scientific evaluation of the 
patient and an accurate and useful presentation of the scientific 
conclusions to the court. The abhorrence of the psychiatric disci-
pline for value judgments involving the moral and ethical behavior 
of its patients is well known;37 yet in the Michigan commitment 
proceedings the physician seems to forget this abhorrence when 
dealing with his legal brethren. All too often in this situation he 
not only evaluates the defendant's psychological status, but judges 
his behavior, estimates its social and ethical significance, and de-
cides on a fitting consequence, be it commitment or trial. Such a 
sacrifice of professional identity and its replacement by a quasi-
legal status is not without a price; the physician has enormously 
complicated if not completely lost his therapeutic advantage. The 
patient who feels that he has been committed as the result of his 
confidential utterances to the examining physician loses confidence 
not in just the "committing doctor" but in all physicians. 
2. The Doctor at the Hospital. The label "hospital" con-
notes a long tradition of alleviation of pain and suffering dictated 
by the appropriate and humane application of the science and the 
art of medicine. Such application is traditionally entrusted to an 
84 See Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court, 40 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 943 (1927). 
35 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. 
36 M1CH. CoNsr. art. 2, § 16 (due process); § 19 (speedy trial). 
37 See GUITMACHER &: WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 406-08 (1952). 
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individual having both in name and in function the title "doctor." 
The patient admitted to Ionia State Hospital by virtue of the dis-
torted role of the examining physician has already begun to suspect 
the individual bearing the title "doctor" and to wonder at his 
intentions. 
Many of the patients at Ionia State Hospital do not consider 
it a hospital but rather a prison and, in fact, an extremely unde-
sirable prison. For the majority, it is a prison to which one is 
committed on an arbitrary and incomprehensible basis; it is a 
a prison in which apparent medical functions are carried on in a 
mechanical fashion without reference to any previous or future 
framework; it is a prison in which hopes of release gradually are 
transformed into despair and finally into psychotic delusions. The 
Ionia atmosphere is predominantly composed of feelings of un-
certainty and insecurity. Such feelings have their origin in, and 
are reinforced by, the uncertainty of the statute, the uncertainty in 
the mind of the court, and the uncertainty in the minds of the 
examining physicians. Uncertainty continues at the hospital in 
the minds of the patient and the doctors. 
Is the hospital dealing with an alleged criminal or with a sick 
human being? Is its role that of a non-judgmental, therapeutically-
oriented institution, or is it in fact a custodial burying ground for 
potentially dangerous persons who by social caprice and legal con-
science are not sent to prison? Is its goal to restore its patients to 
health and to social competency or to provide the necessary treat-
ment which would allow the patient to achieve legal competence? 
It is answers to these questions that Ionia State Hospital lacks, and 
it is this lack which produces the stultifying mechanical nature of 
its proceedings and the insidious pessimism of its atmosphere. 
Improvement in the hospital's physical facilities or even in 
the size and quality of its staff could not alone bring about an 
effective hospital operation. A realizable therapeutic mission is the 
sine qua non of a successful hospital. 
3. Significance for the Patient. What of the patient? How 
does he react to the uncertainty and the endless drifting to which 
he is subjected? The answer is simple: he becomes sicker. The 
records studied at Ionia are replete with examples of patients who 
in the initial stages of their hospitalization made significant im-
provement. However, because such improvement was not meas-
ured against any therapeutic framework or applied to any definite 
goal other than vague concepts of social competency or "restora-
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tion to sanity," it passed almost unnoticed. At such a time the 
patient is struck by the realization that his chances of release are 
remote. His already sick and flimsy personality structure collapses 
and the frightening hostility and desolating worthlessness against 
which the patient has struggled are intensified. Possibilities of 
mental health become more remote. Questions of parole or dis-
charge become academic. The picture of the gradually decreasing 
frequency of the doctors' visits and the less frequent staff inter-
views looms large. Concepts of incurability are considered by both 
patient and hospital staff. Many human beings are lost, not a 
dozen or fifty, but literally hundreds, to themselves and to society. 
V. A LOOK AT ALTERNATIVE METHODS 
A. Federal Procedure 
The examination of the defendant to determine competency 
under the Michigan statute is generally conducted in the county 
jail. Examination in a jail atmosphere has been severely criticized 
on the ground that no thorough physical, mental, or neurological 
examination is possible under prison conditions and because rarely 
is a study of a case history of the defendant even attempted.38 
In an attempt to eliminate these defects, the federal government 
has enacted a statute39 which provides that whenever the de-
fendant's mental competency to stand trial becomes an issue in a 
criminal case the trial court may order the defendant to a mental 
hospital for observation and examination.40 If at the end of the 
examination period the doctors' report indicates a state of present 
incompetency, the court conducts a competency hearing. If the 
court is then convinced of the defendant's inability to proceed, it 
may order his commitment.41 
However, this system would not solve all of the Michigan 
problems. Although it is true that an examination at a hospital 
would be more thorough than one in jail, the confusion which 
exists in Michigan between non-responsibility and incompetency 
could still exist. Furthermore, hospital staffs, just like individual 
doctors, are susceptible to the idea that it is more humane to the de-
38 See Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of Experts: Hospital Examination of 
Criminal Defendants Before Trial, 2 LAw 8: CoNTEM. PROB. 419 (1935). 
39 18 u.s.c. § 4244 (1958). 
40 Some states have enacted similar statutes. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 27, 
§ ll8 (1954); N.D. CENTURY CODE § 29-20·01 (1960); WIS. STAT. § 9572.7 (3) (1959). 
4118 u.s.c. § 4246 (1958). 
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fendant to declare him incompetent than it is to require his trial 
to proceed. 
Neither the federal system nor the Michigan system makes 
provision for the incompetent defendant with a valid defense on 
the merits to raise initially this defense. 
B. Model Penal Code Approach 
In addition to providing for examination of the accused by a 
"psychiatrist" rather than by a "reputable physician," the Model 
Penal Code42 provides for a determination by the judge at the 
initial stages of the proceeding of both the defendant's mental 
competency to stand trial and his responsibility for the criminal 
act.43 The latter determination can be made in Michigan only if 
the accused is competent to stand trial. Under the Model Code if 
the medical report by the examining psychiatrist indicates that the 
defendant suffered from a mental disease which "substantially im-
paired his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, and the court 
is satisfied that such impairment was sufficient to exclude respon-
sibility, the court shall enter judgment of acquittal on the ground 
of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility."44 This avoids 
commitment on the grounds of incompetency and removes the 
threat of a trial. This is important for the psychiatrists participat-
ing in our study strongly believe that the threat of trial and the un-
certainty of his status deters the recovery of incompetents at Ionia. 
The Model Code's provision for non-responsibility eliminates 
any reference to "right" or "wrong."45 A person is non-responsible 
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of 
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law. This is a meaningful and significant 
contribution to the law relating to trial competency. The Model 
Code recognizes that many commitments for incompetency are 
the result of dissatisfaction with the harsh tests of responsibility. 
This dissatisfaction too often leads to prosecution and defense 
acquiescence in automatic classification of a defendant as incom-
petent to stand trial and to speedy commitment to a state hospital. 
42 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 4.01-.09 (Tent. Draft. No. 4, 1955). 
43 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
H MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
41i MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). 
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The provisions of the Model Code permitting the court to find the 
defendant non-responsible at the initial sanity hearing will be 
effective in removing the threat of a trial upon the defendant's 
hospital release only if there is also liberalization of the traditional 
M'Naghten rules of criminal responsibility.46 
C. Trial on the Merits at the Option of the Defendant 
A defense may exist which does not depend on the competency 
of the accused for its assertion. For example, counsel for the de-
fendant may be able to show that the prosecution is barred as a 
matter of law; or that the indictment on its face discloses that the 
statute of limitations has run; or that he can assert an affirmative 
defense which does not require the defendant's personal participa-
tion.47 Frequently an affirmative defense is jeopardized by the 
passage of time. Memories fade, witnesses die or move away, and 
documentary records may become unavailable. In many cases 
the defense will be that of non-responsibility; here the longer a 
trial is postponed, the more difficult it is for the defendant to 
make such a defense. Indeed, in this situation, it is to the de-
fendant's advantage to be seen by the jury before regaining his 
sanity. The vital question, then, is whether defendant's counsel 
can proceed with an affirmative defense without, by so doing, fore-
closing his client's incompetency plea. 
In this country a few states permit a defendant a trial on the 
incompetency issue along with a trial on the merits.48 A recently-
enacted provision of the Texas Criminal Code49 provides that the 
jury shall state in the verdict whether the defendant is "sane or 
insane" at the time of the trial. If the issue of the defendant's 
46 The M'Naghten rules require for a showing of nonresponsibility that the accused, 
at the time he committed the act, was laboring under such a "defect of reason, from 
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if 
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." M'Naghten's 
Case, IO Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). In America the M'Naghten 
test is still the primary test of criminal responsibility. In at least 29 states it is the only 
test, and in others it is still the main test supplemented only by the irresistible impulse 
test. See WEIHoFEN, MENTAL DISORDER. 51, 69-72. Cf. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 
862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). This case abolished the M'Naghten rule in the District of Columbia 
by replacing the right-wrong test with one which asks if the defendant is suffering from a 
mental disease or defect and if the criminal act is the product of such mental disease or 
defect. However, the liberalizing of the responsibility law signaled by Durham has not 
gained acceptance. See Watson, Durham Plus Five Years: Development of the Law of 
Criminal Responsibility in the District of Columbia, 116 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 289 (1959). 
47Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. 
L. REv. 832 (1960). . 
48 WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER 456-57. 
49 TEX. CoDE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 932b (Supp. 1960). 
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competency is tried along with the criminal charge and it is found 
that the defendant is "insane at the time of the trial"50 he is then 
committed to a state mental hospital. When it is determined that 
he has recovered his "sanity," the proceedings against him con-
tinue. Although it is not specifically stated in the statute, the clear 
implication is that the defendant is entitled to a new trial even if 
he is found guilty of the crime at the same trial which found him 
incompetent to stand trial. It also appears that the defendant is 
entitled to go ahead with the trial on the merits of the criminal 
charge even though he may in fact be incompetent. In Ex parte 
Hodges51 the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the 
accused was deprived of his rights guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and by the state constitu-
tion to a speedy trial and to effective aid of counsel where the trial 
court declined to proceed to trial in a murder case and required a 
preliminary trial to determine the sanity of the defendant. 
Two recent English cases have considered the question of a 
trial on the merits prior to a competency determination. In 
Regina v. Roberts52 the Queen's Bench held that the defense 
counsel could try the general issue of his client's guilt prior to 
the competency determination without sacrificing! the incom-
petency plea.53 The nature of the defense which the defendant's 
counsel wished to raise was not disclosed. The court indicated that 
in the event the defendant were found responsible for the crime, 
but at the same time incompetent for trial, he would be sent to a 
hospital for the criminally insane. The court did not discuss the 
different and difficult problem of what disposition was to be made 
of the defendant upon a subsequent restoration to competency. 
However, in 1957 the Queen's Bench declined to follow the 
Roberts case, holding that a jury must be sworn to try the fitness 
of the defendant to plead as a preliminary issue.54 It was said that 
an insane man cannot be tried. 
50 Ibid. 
lll 166 Tex. Crim. 433, 314 S.W.2d 581 (1958). 
52 [1954] 2 Q.B. 329. 
113 "[T]o insist on the issue of fitness to plead being tried [first] might result in the 
grave injustice of detaining as a criminal lunatic a man who was quite innocent; indeed, 
it might result in the public mischief that a person so detained would be assumed, in the 
eyes of the police and of the authorities, to have been the person responsible for the 
crime -whether he was or not - and investigations which might have led to the appre-
hension of the true criminal would not take place." Regina v. Roberts, (1954] 2 Q.B. 
829, 833. 
54 Regina v. Beynon, [1957] 2 Q.B. Ill. 
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Professor Foote of the University of Pennsylvania Law School 
has proposed a plan similar to the procedure followed in Regina 
v. Roberts whereby at the defense counsel's option the case would 
be tried on the merits without foreclosing the defendant's protec-
tion of the incompetency plea.55 His plan includes the following 
provisions: 
" (1) In the event that the prosecutor or court moves for 
pre-trial mental examination to determine competency, if the 
defendant is unrepresented counsel should be appointed to 
represent him on the motion. Only in this way can there be 
assured full development of an issue which may have an ad-
verse effect on the defendant. If the defendant (perhaps be-
cause of his illness) refuses counsel,56 an amicus curiae should 
be appointed to make an independent presentation of the de-
fendant's interests.57 
" (2) After the court has proceeded to have the defendant 
mentally examined and has heard evidence on the issue of 
competency to stand trial, if it finds that the defendant is com-
petent it should so rule and all subsequent proceedings will 
follow their normal course. If the court is of the opinion that 
the defendant is incompetent, a ruling to this effect should be 
deferred if (a) counsel moves to dismiss the indictment, or for 
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, or raises any other 
matter which can be determined in a pre-trial hearing, or (b) 
counsel alleges that there is a good faith defense on the merits 
and chooses to go to trial on the merits notwithstanding de-
fendant's incompetency. In these situations the court shall 
determine the pre-trial question or proceed to a trial on the 
merits. If as a result the indictment is dismissed or if there 
is a finding of not guilty on the merits, that will be the end of 
the matter, although of course the court or [the prosecuting 
attorney] ... can refer the defendant's case to the appropriate 
local mental health authorities for possible state civil commit-
ment. If there is a verdict of guilty, the court should then 
rule that the defendant is incompetent, set the verdict aside 
and commit the defendant ... until he is sufficiently recov-
ered to be retried or until other appropriate disposition can 
be made of the case. 
55 Foote, supra note 47, at 845-46. 
56 "E.g., United States v. Miller, 131 F. Supp. 88 (D. Vt. 1955), aff'd, 233 F.2d 171 
(2d Cir. 1956)." Foote, supra note 47, at 845 n.40. 
57 "This suggestion was made in Seidner v. United States, 260 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 
1958), where it was anticipated that defendant would refuse counsel." Foote, supra note 
47, at 845 n.41. 
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" (3) The procedures outlined in (2) above should also 
be made available at defendant's election. Under present 
law counsel representing a defendant who is both probably 
incompetent and probably not guilty on the merits is required 
to make an election prejudicial to his client. If he moves for 
a pre-trial finding of incompetency, he waives any possibility 
of seeking a present determination on the merits, whereas if 
he goes to trial on the merits he waives the incompetency 
issue.''58 
Professor Foote's plan has considerable merit and should be 
studied carefully. If the defendant were found not guilty on the 
merits he would not face the ignominy of a commitment as a crim-
inally insane person. A civil commitment carries no such stigma 
and if the defendant were mentally ill he would be entitled to be 
treated as a patient, not as a potential criminal. If he were ac-
quitted on grounds of non-responsibility, he would be committed 
to a hospital, and since he would not have a trial awaiting him upon 
his discharge, his treatment could be geared solely to his mental 
condition with the threat of trial no longer impeding his cure. 
If he were found guilty of the crime he would not be sent to prison 
but the verdict would be set aside and he would be committed to 
a hospital as a person incompetent to stand trial. 
The Foote plan does not suggest what should be done with a 
guilty defendant upon his restoration to competency, other than 
retrial or "other appropriate disposition."59 Nor did the Roberts 
case need to deal ·with this problem. But the problems attendant 
to this part of the Foote plan cannot be ignored. Facing a virtual 
"free trial" at the defendant's option, prosecutors and judges could 
be expected to raise the issue of the defendant's competency much 
less frequently. If the defendant were without counsel, it is likely 
that in many more cases than at present he would be tried and 
convicted simply because no one raised the competency issue. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Statutory Changes 
The present Michigan parole system in conjunction with in-
competency law is not only anomalous but may very likely be un-
constitutional as well, for if the defendant is well enough for parole 
58 Foote, supra note 47, at 845-46. 
59 Id. at 846. 
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he is well enough for trial. Therefore, parole should be eliminated 
from the Michigan incompetency statute. In addition, the statute60 
should be amended to achieve separation of incompetency from 
responsibility criteria. The problems of legal incompetency to 
stand trial and legal responsibility for criminal acts are separate 
and distinct61 and to attempt to set up machinery for handling 
both problems within a single statute only results in confusion. 
The procedures for examination, commitment, and treatment of 
incompetents should be described in a separate statute or provision 
which should make clear that the criteria for finding a person in-
competent, commitment, and discharge back to the committing 
court are the same. 
Serious consideration should be given to making the time 
spent at Ionia as the result of an incompetency commitment a 
"credit" against any subsequent conviction and sentence.62 Since 
the defendants are kept under as rigid supervision and control as 
they would be in the state prison, and since society is as fully pro-
tected by isolating them at Ionia as at Jackson, it would seem fair 
to allow the time spent at Ionia to be computed against any sub-
sequent sentence. To complement this proposition, consideration 
should be given to amending the statute to provide for defendant's 
discharge from Ionia and for civil commitment, if necessary, when 
the maximum prison sentence would have expired. 
An alternative proposal would require amending the statute 
to provide for a maximum period of time for which the defendant 
could be committed as incompetent. For example, the statute 
could provide that at the end of a two-year period he would have 
to be discharged from Ionia and then either tried or civilly com-
mitted. This would set an absolute time limit on the possibility 
of trial, which should have salutary therapeutic effects, if not dur-
ing, then certainly after the two-year period, since the uncertainty 
of a trial appears to be a factor which inhibits recovery from the 
mental affliction. It would also exert pressure on the hospital staff 
to ready the defendant for trial. To protect the defendant, the 
statute should include a provision that no treament to speed res-
toration to competency should be given if it would have deleteri-
60 MICH. COMP. LAws § 767.27 (1948). 
61 The problems of administration are distinct, but the severity of the responsibility 
tests is likely to affect the extent to which the incompetency procedures are used. See 
WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 53.54 (1956). 
62 See text accompanying note 33 supra. 
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ous effects on final and ultimate recovery.63 Thus responsibility 
for the ultimate cure in severe cases of mental illness would be left 
with civil institutions. 
B. Articulation of Goals 
Part of the problem in the administration of the incompetency 
law today appears to stem from a deviation from the original pur-
pose of the proceedings, which was to afford the incompetent de-
fendant protection from trial. It is our belief that prosecutors and 
judges view Ionia as a convenient place to send those defendants 
who cannot carry the burden of the non-responsibility plea, and 
yet are such pitiful subjects that they prefer to consign them to 
Ionia rather than to prison.64 If this contention is correct, commit-
ment has become a sentencing without a trial. Unless adequate 
safeguards are provided to protect the incompetent from remain-
ing the forgotten man of the legal system, and unless clear goals 
are articulated which are comprehensible to both lawyer and doc-
tor, he ·will continue to be assigned to Ionia for treatment, only to 
be lost and ultimately forgotten. 
In this process the first role of the physician should be that of 
an expert witness. It is his job to offer a scientific description of 
the defendant to the court with clear-cut substantiation of his con-
clusions. The merits of such testimony and its relevance to the 
legal question of incompetency are matters to be decided by the 
judge or jury. The doctor's second function is to apply his 
therapeutic skills to the treatment of the patient committed to a 
hospital on the grounds of incompetency. Here the therapeutic 
approach and the medical judgments must lie completely within 
the province of the physician. Nonetheless, the goals toward 
which the physician strives and the results which he hopes to attain 
63 This provision would prevent extensive shock or drug therapy which could render 
the defendant competent at the expense of his ultimate recovery to full mental health. 
64' Professor Weihofen believes that incompetency procedures are used to avoid con• 
viction of mentally disturbed defendants who could not carry the arduous burden of the 
M'Naghten criminal responsibility tests. He refers to figures for Scotland and England 
to support his view and states: "The same factors also operate in varying degree in the 
American states. I have no statistics, but it is my impression that an increasing proportion 
of the cases are disposed of on a plea of mental unfitness to stand trial, instead of by the 
actual trial in which the disorder is raised as a defense. In New York, I understand this 
is now as prevalent a practice as in England; over half the cases are disposed of this way. 
This has the advantage of avoiding the expense and effort of a criminal trial, as well as 
the advantage of employing a less rigid and artificial legal test of 'insanity.'" WEIHOFEN, 
THE URGE TO PUNISH 53-54 (1956). 
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through his efforts must be defined by the law.65 The law must 
make its standards clear and meaningful to the doctor to enable 
him to evaluate a defendant's competency and to apply his 
therapeutic skills in restoring his patient's fitness for trial in the 
shortest possible time consistent with ultimate recovery of mental 
health. 
John H. Hess, M.D. 
Henry B. Pearsall, S.Ed. 
Donald A. Slichter, S.Ed. 
Herbert E .Thomas, M.D. 
£5 It should be noted that the concept of incompetency as it exists in the law does 
not exist in medicine. No physician within the framework of his science or his experience 
alone can sensibly state that a given individual is incompetent. Incompetency is a legal 
definition, not amenable to precise medical standards of mental health. Psychiatrists, 
upon whose testimony and judgment the administration of the law depends, need a defi-
nition not in terms of "incompetency to stand trial" but rather in psychoanalytic ego 
functions. 
